Holocaust historian Daniel Blatman says he is astounded at how quickly Israel is hurtling toward fascism. ‘The moment the judicial reform passes, we will be in another reality,’ he says
Ayelett Shani
Please introduce yourself.
I’m Daniel Blatman, a professor in the Institute for Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University. My fields of interest are the Holocaust, Nazism, fascism, genocide and East European Jewry during the Holocaust. At the moment I’m in Poland. I am involved in establishing the Warsaw Ghetto Museum [scheduled to open in 2025].
We are speaking because I came across an opinion piece you wrote for the Haaretz Hebrew website about six years ago. The text feels like it could have been written this morning – it’s a text that is in large measure prophetic.
“Prophetic” is a big word. I can say that I’ve been aware for a long time now that a process was coming to fruition here that will lead to a collision of forces, and I am truly not optimistic about the possibility that at its conclusion, Israel will continue to be a properly functioning democracy.
You wrote the article in 2017, when Benjamin Netanyahu was still be investigated only about Cases 1000 and 2000. It wasn’t clear whether indictments would even be filed. In the piece, you argue that ultimately, the judiciary will be destroyed in order to help him stay in power.
That was when the details of the cases had only begun to come to light. Look, I’m a historian. I am definitely not a prophet, and I didn’t feel that I was writing some sort of prophetic text. I argued that Israel was deteriorating into a situation in which the entire judicial system would be twisted in order to serve one person in power, at the expense of the democratic stability and the democratic regime in Israel. What I envisioned was a leader who was building an image of himself as someone who is above the law and above the conventional norms of judicial equality for all citizens – and that public legitimization for this was growing. There is a large public of citizens who in the last election voted for all kinds of parties that today form the coalition: more or less Haredi, more or less nationalistic – it makes no difference. That public is divided on many issues, but united around one common denominator.
You called it Netanyahu’s populism. Of course there is nothing new in the notion that the prime minister is a populist politician. Perhaps you can explain more specifically what you meant, because populism is a broad concept. The generally accepted definition is apparently that of the contemporary Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde: that populism divides society into two opposite groups: the people and the elites.
Populism is a political system that developed in the 20th century and has assumed multiple forms in the 21st century. But that concept, of the people against the elites – be they economic, academic or aristocratic elites – is common to all those forms. Populism can lead to fascism. Or to other types of authoritarian regimes that we know from history – not necessarily Nazism, which people always focus on – but to military dictatorships such as existed in South America. There, too, society was divided into two categories: “with me” or “against me.”
“With me,” meaning with the leader in his struggle against the elites. The leader who personifies the discrimination, the exclusion, the remoteness from the centers of power that are under the control of the elites.
In populism, the people is the true sovereign and the leader is the true and authentic voice of a society that forges the collective partnership that defines the nation – in contradistinction to the others, the elitists, who seized the centers of power and spend all their time looking exclusively after their own interests. Another principle, which in the end is the essence of populism, is that the leader is a paternal figure. Now, what gives populist regimes their power? We often make the mistake of thinking we’re talking about a dictatorship that terrorizes the public, with people being afraid to speak out and with secret police knocking on doors at night. But it doesn’t look like that.
Dictatorships in the style of Hungary’s Viktor Orban make a point of preserving a democratic façade. The oppression is not violent. These regimes are more like voluntary dictatorships – with the people’s cooperation.
By the way, the most terrible dictatorships of the 20th century, those that really did send people to prison and detention camps, were characterized by admiration for the leader. Stalin was a popular leader. Hitler was a popular leader, until a certain stage. There is something about populism in its Israeli iteration – and of course I am not comparing Netanyahu to Hitler or Stalin – that is related to his deep connection to broad swaths of the public, which see him as an exalted figure with singular abilities.
For sure! After all, people in Likud think that his IQ is the sixth-highest in the world, or something like that.
That is part of a kind of cult of personality, of the special bond with the people that began to be formed as early as 2015, after Netanyahu won the election; it assumed a different dimension when his legal entanglements began. Netanyahu is not Israel’s first populist leader – leaving aside [Menachem] Begin and [David] Ben-Gurion for the moment, the populist leader who was closest to achieving Netanyahu’s status was [Ariel] Sharon. He also became entangled in a slew of corrupt practices. But he was smart enough to identify the dangers, so as not to cross the line and to avoid getting to the point we’re at today in Israel: with a populist government that is approaching fascism. And I think we must ask ourselves how this happened: How a society that sanctified the democratic principles of the supremacy of the law and the law’s authority to protect human dignity and freedom, sanctifies a leader.
A common pattern is discernible in the rise of populist regimes. There’s part of society that already harbors the feeling that it’s being discriminated against, where a broad public feels they have been deprived of something. The sentiment that induces a public to identify with these narratives is a real one, isn’t it? It’s not a matter of cynicism.
| Corrupt politicians and convicted criminals understand that if they do not eradicate the independence of the judiciary, they will not be able to remain in office. They will be removed by the court or end up in jail.
Daniel Blatman
The sentiment is real, and there’s a pattern that repeats itself in a kind of historical form of cynicism, on a temporal axis. Feelings of discrimination. Unease because of economic crises. The basis is always the feeling among a large public that it’s lacking something, that something basic in its existence has been diminished – from national pride to existential anger. It is not a partner, it is not getting something that everyone else is getting.
‘Persecution story’
Is it [the feeling of discrimination] authentic among politicians too? Donald Trump and Netanyahu, for example, come from privileged backgrounds.
Netanyahu and Trump both come from affluent families, but they were very adept at forging an image of themselves as being outcasts. With Netanyahu, it’s about his father who was persecuted, and who is himself being hounded too, and about how difficult the struggle has been to get to the center [of power] and become legitimate, and to push himself into the elites who didn’t want to accept him. That is nonsense, of course. Those people [Trump and Netanyahu] are elites, and the persecution story serves them to connect with the electorate.
What about Menachem Begin? He was the first to bring the concept of discrimination to the surface, and he also made political use of it.
Begin was not a populist in that sense. He harped on discrimination, but even with all the reverence shown him, no one thought he was above the law. He would not have dared to crush democracy. I believe he would not even have tried, and that if he had tried, his party would not have allowed anything of the sort.
But in populist regimes, the leader is above the party. The party no longer really exists.
What’s new here? Does anyone know who Orban’s No. 2 is? Or [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan’s? In a populist regime, the party is no more than a tool that is supposed to assist the leader to realize his plan, and provide him with services. The party in regimes like that is not a living political body like it is in democratic regimes. It is moribund. There are no arguments. There is no range of views. It is solely a tool that serves the leader.
As you’re speaking, I’m thinking about the image of Netanyahu in the courthouse at the start of his trial [in May, 2020], with all his ministers behind him, in masks.
That is an iconic image, I think, on the road to the reality we are experiencing today.
How does the corruption fit into this picture? Many populist leaders present themselves as fighting the corruption of the elites. [Rodrigo] Duterte. [Jair] Bolsonaro. Trump. They ride the ticket of being “warriors against corruption,” and then become entangled in corruption themselves.
Where does the line pass between what is defined as corruption and what is legitimate in society’s eyes? We are talking here about what is normative in a particular society. There are countries in Africa in which Netanyahu’s offenses are not defined as corruption. Tomorrow the Knesset will pass a law stipulating that gifts from friends that are worth less than $100,000 are not corruption but legitimate gifts. A broad public does not think Netanyahu is corrupt. Or that [Shas leader Arye] Dery is corrupt. That public supports them even though it’s aware of their deeds. So, how does one define corruption?
In the coming weeks, at least, we will still be able to use [existing] legal criteria.
Progressive liberal democracies define the normative in accordance with legal criteria. At the moment, a collision is taking place in Israel between systems of values that a liberal democratic structure is incapable of containing. A collision of norms. Of conceptions. In a democracy, a stable and independent legal system is the foundation of all public, economic, social and political activity. Politicians will always prefer weak judges, which will not interfere with their being reelected even if they fail in the execution of their office or their actions are perceived as corrupt. That’s what makes democracy a system that is so fragile and so susceptible to pressures.
Israel today is exactly at that breaking point. Corrupt politicians and convicted criminals understand that if they do not eradicate the independence of the judiciary, they will not be able to remain in office. They will be removed by the court, as happened to Dery, or end up in jail, which is Netanyahu’s great fear. Accordingly, their goal is to do away with the judicial system, thereby ensuring their rule and their political power.
I watched Netanyahu’s recent press conference, when he declared that the Israeli economy is not in danger, that big capital will not flee. People ask what the connection is between the entry of investors into a country and a situation in which the government [alone] selects judges. It’s exactly here that this matter of corruption comes into play. Once there is no judiciary to protect the economy, and it is subject to the arbitrariness of a political official – no one wants to risk their money. Because if something happens, the court will not protect them. Why aren’t people investing in Hungary today, the way they did before Orban? I think that in Israel, the regime doesn’t grasp the connection, or doesn’t want to grasp it.
We can assume that it grasps it very well.
Netanyahu does, but I’m not sure he knows how to deal with it, because he’s surrounded by others who are leading him toward ideological populism. Bibi is not an ideologue; he never was an ideologue. He understands [the economic risks] but he is surrounded by ministers who are leading him to wherever they are leading him, and has the [criminal] trial hanging over his head, too. It’s impossible to ignore that.
In your 2017 article, you maintain that corruption is a kind of prior condition for the rise of populism. Explain, please.
In a society based on values of liberal democracy, of equality, justice and decency, the bar that public figures confront is high, and the system fights fiercely against all incidents of corruption that are revealed, certainly in the case of elected officials. A populist regime cannot develop under those conditions. In contrast, when the bar is low, when the elected official is not committed to justice, to decency, to integrity – he can accumulate strength and power such as he would not be able to accumulate if he had played by the rules.
| One thing we do see here is a regime that is starting to execute a speedy judicial, political, moral revolution – like in Germany. From January 1933, it was all over. Within half a year the country became unrecognizable.
Daniel Blatman
In 1977, Yitzhak Rabin resigned because of his wife’s [illegal U.S.] bank account. That was more than 40 years ago. That was the bar then, and that’s exactly the difference. We see today that the majority of the public that supports Dery and Netanyahu is indifferent to their deeds. We see that among those sitting at the government table today are politicians who are suspected of breaking the law, and politicians who were convicted of breaking the law, and the public that elected them thinks it’s legitimate for them to lead it.
That public doesn’t only think it’s legitimate for them to be its leaders – it thinks it’s legitimate for them to revise the judicial system.
Of course. So we see, effectively, how corruption destroys politics. What importance does the political arena in Israel have today, if it is no longer subject to judicial oversight?
Just jobs.
If these judicial “reforms” are implemented, in a reality as complex as that of Israel, it will lead to disaster. We are not Poland. In Poland, there will be an election in half a year. Whether or not the government is replaced, the people there will live with it. But in the place where Israel is, with its domestic social composition, with the occupation, with a minority [Arab] population of 20 percent, with such a complex state of affairs in terms of security, society, the economy – populism is a recipe for ruin. Not only of moral values, but of the country’s entire existence.
I don’t know how loudly I can shout out about this, and I really am only a humble historian, as they say. It’s a situation that is calamitous for the country’s existence. The creative minds will flee. Life will become bland, hard and dangerous. It might sound hallucinatory, but the danger is existential. It is genuine. Do you know what the biggest threat is to the continued existence of the State of Israel? It’s not Likud. It’s not even the thugs who run wild in the territories. It’s the Kohelet Policy Forum [a reference to a conservative, right-wing think tank supported by wealthy U.S. donors].”
People aren’t sufficiently familiar with them. They don’t read their publications. I follow them closely. They are creating a broad social and political manifesto which, if adopted eventually by Israel, will turn it into a completely different country. You say “fascism” to people and they picture soldiers cruising the streets. No. It won’t look like that. Capitalism will still be extant. People will still be able to go abroad – if they are allowed into other countries. There will be good restaurants. But a person’s ability to feel that there is something protecting him, other than the regime’s good will – because it either will or not protect him, as it sees fit – will no longer be there.
Three years ago, I interviewed Sebnem Korur Fincancı, a professor and social activist from Turkey who was persecuted by the government. She said something that I’ve thought about every day since then: that outside everything looks the same, people are sitting in cafés, playing backgammon, sometimes laughing – but actually nothing is the same.
Yes. I understand what she is saying. More than that: Erdogan’s regime three, four and five years ago, was not what is happening today. There is a process that repeats itself in this type of regime, whether it’s less or more extreme. Escalation occurs. All the time. Things don’t stand still. It’s not that there will be populism and it will stay like that, because the more the regime feels that it’s losing its hold, whether due to domestic opposition, or to the economy, or to international pressure – and Israel will face all those tests – the more it will step up the oppression.
It will also strengthen its grip on the public. The regime reaches a point of no return. As its policies of oppression and change continue, the more it has to lose.
In Turkey the process is only becoming more extreme. In recent years comprehensive purges have taken place in the army, the police and the internal security forces – only Erdogan’s loyalists are being appointed. The courts have lost their judicial independence almost completely. Serious restrictions are being imposed on nongovernmental media. And worst of all, journalists and university lecturers are being arrested or fired. I have several acquaintances – Turkish-born historians who live in the United States – who deal with the subjects of the Armenian genocide and modern Turkey, whose families back home have told them explicitly not to visit, because they will not be allowed to leave again. It’s impossible to know how far it will go. One MK, from [Itamar] Ben-Gvir’s party, I think, said half-jokingly: If that’s what we want, we won’t have an election for 10 years.
‘Recipe for disaster’
I don’t think it was a joke. Why should they forgo so much power voluntarily? In the name of what? In the name of democracy? And it won’t be accomplished by means of a crude step of canceling the elections. They will simply pass all kinds of regulations, chip away quietly.
That sounds fantastical, and if you’d said it four years ago, people would have though you were off your rocker, but you’re right. Today everything is possible. The moment that these “reforms” pass as they stand, everything is possible.
And what will happen then? What scenarios does history offer us?
The examples I can think of are South American dictatorships. Brazil. Argentina. Chile. They underwent processes leading to a populist dictatorship of one kind or another in the 1970s and 1980s. The regimes collapsed, but the countries were deeply damaged. It took Chile 40 years to recover from Pinochet. Argentina has not recovered to this day from the government of the generals. The country’s finest minds emigrated. No investments came in. Corruption became rampant and didn’t stop, even after the populist regime fell, because it was already deeply embedded in the system. The courts found it difficult to function even when the government lifted restrictions. The damage is cumulative, long-term.
| Populism wins when society is ripe to receive it. Israeli society was ripe to receive the present government … because the most extreme wing pulled everyone after it. Ideas that were once on the fringes have become legitimate.
Daniel Blatman
Israel is a small country. True, it is strong militarily and economically, but it is small and located in a complex region, with tremendous internal tensions. That is a recipe for disaster. The outcry being voiced by many people today is not hysteria. It is based on what happened in other places. We didn’t invent populism, you know. It has existed for generations. You don’t need a world war to bring about a country’s collapse.
The replacement of ministerial legal advisers could be enough.
The heart of this story is the judiciary. The appointment of judges and legal advisers. The dismantlement of Israel’s High Court of Justice. Bibi-ist populism, which is backed by the power and clout of the fascistic messianic types who surround him and the politicians for whom integrity was never a value, is taking its final steps toward fascism. From the moment that Netanyahu crossed the Rubicon in regard to preserving the supremacy of the law and the independence of the Supreme Court, he went de facto – even if he does not understand it or give it any thought – from being a traditional populist leader into one in a saliently fascistic style.
What most amazes me in this process that is now unfolding is the speed. Here, there is already nothing that can be done. I compare, I go back all the time to my historical flashbacks. I am astounded at the speed with which things are being implemented. No one remembers that just three months ago there was an election.
That just last October, in advance of that election, Bibi didn’t want to have his picture taken together with Ben-Gvir.
We are now in a process that should have taken a few years and not a few months. We haven’t seen such a situation before, either in Hungary or in Poland. It took time [there]. Years. They prepared society. They did it gradually. They created propaganda campaigns. They were elected two and three times in order to get that far. And here, his whole revolution is occurring within three months.
The moment the new legislation passes, we will be in another reality. It really does recall Germany in 1933. But, not in terms of the regime’s moral character – Israel will not perpetrate genocide, one hopes.
Let’s not commit to anything at this stage.
Yes, and as I said, there won’t be brown-shirted soldiers in the streets. But one thing we do see here is a regime that is starting to execute a speedy judicial, political, moral revolution – like in Germany. From January 1933, it was all over. Within half a year the country became unrecognizable. A dictatorship was institutionalized that hung on until 1945. That means one thing, from my point of view: that German society was ready to swallow it. If 50 million Germans didn’t bring the country to a halt when Hitler came to power, apparently that society was ready to accept [the new order]. That is Israel’s great test today.
Isn’t the conclusion from this conversation that Israeli society has already failed the test? That there is something sick, impaired, not only in the populist government but in the public that wants such a government?
Israeli society has undergone a process of radicalization. There is a large mass that does not sanctify democratic and liberal values. The radicalization can be explained in all kinds of ways – the strengthening of religion, security reasons, demonization of the Arab enemy. In the previous government, too, most of Israel society didn’t want to see the United Arab List there. Which is why I think declarations by opposition leaders to the effect that “with half a [Knesset] seat here and half a seat there, we would have won,” are nonsense.
Populism wins when society is ripe to receive it. Israeli society was ripe to receive the present government. Not because of Likud’s victory, but because the most extreme wing pulled everyone after it. What was once extreme right is today center. Ideas that were once on the fringes have become legitimate. As a historian whose field is the Holocaust and Nazism, it’s hard for me to say this, but there are neo-Nazi ministers in the government today. You don’t see that anywhere else – not in Hungary, not in Poland – ministers who, ideologically, are pure racists.
What we are seeing today is a kind of genie that is bursting from the bottle, and I’m not sure it can be stopped. I am not embarrassed to say that I am afraid. I think that a demonstration of 100,000 or 200,000 won’t help. If two million people don’t rise up now and fight for democracy, fight for liberalism, the conclusion must be that Israeli society accepts what’s going on. That it’s already there.
Source: Haaretz Newspaper
